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I. Introduction 
Joint ownership of oil and gas exploration and production rights—
whether held through fee mineral ownership or ownership of an oil and gas 
lease—arise in many ways. Co-tenants of a mineral estate may each lease to 
different companies, or companies leasing adjacent acreage may be 
required to pool their leases to form a drilling unit. Individual leases may be 
jointly held by several lessees. Farmout agreements may give rise to co-
ownership of working interest once, for example, payout is achieved. 
Mineral title also tends to become increasingly fragmented over time, 
leaving many working interest owners with undivided leasehold interests 
covering a production area or even a single well. Other times, joint 
ownership is the result of a deliberate decision to spread the cost and risk of 
drilling and development. For example, the holder of a lease may partially 
assign or farmout part of their lease to another party to share risk. 
Regardless of how joint ownership arises, an agreement should be 
reached on a variety of matters including initial drilling, payment of 
expenses, operation of the well, division of production, and further 
development of the property. The joint operating agreement (“JOA”) serves 
this function. A JOA describes the geographic area it covers and specifies 
the fractional interests owned in this area by the various parties having 
working interests in the area. Typically, one of these parties is designated 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol1/iss1/2
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the “operator” with authority to incur expenses and make operational 
decisions. Occasionally, a party, such as a lease owner who has assigned all 
of its lease interests to investors, is named as a “contract” operator. A 
contract operator has standing to enforce the JOA and may bring suit on 
behalf of the participants, even though it lacks any interest in the area 
covered by the JOA.1 The other contracting parties are referred to as “non-
operators.” Each non-operator’s share of both costs and production is 
usually based on its fractional interest in the JOA’s area. A typical JOA is a 
lengthy agreement that addresses many issues, including whether and how 
different combinations of parties can develop the area and how the operator 
will incur costs and bill the non-operators for their share of costs. A JOA 
also addresses how production is to be physically divided among the parties 
in accordance with each party’s interest in the area or well.2 A JOA almost 
always provides the operator with ample remedies against non-operators 
who do not pay their share of operating expenses.3  
A. Paper Goal and Format 
A domestic onshore JOA, at its core, is typically about a 10-20 page 
(legal-sized) standardized document (a “Form JOA”), plus exhibits, 
containing comprehensive provisions addressing the ownership of oil and 
gas drilling rights and the drilling, operation, and production of onshore oil 
and gas wells on those rights. Common sense seasoned with experience 
makes clear, however, that the words of a form contract like a Form JOA 
cannot possibly account for every permutation of oil and gas operations, 
resulting in a close, but often conflicting, reading by lawyers when conflicts 
arise. In addition, the parties to a JOA that was signed more than a dozen 
years ago could not have foreseen the current era of unconventional shale 
oil and shale gas development. Yet, a JOA, like a deed, may govern the 
rights of the parties for many decades and long survive any individual who 
was involved in its negotiation.  
Judges, litigators, and non-oil and gas corporate attorneys have often 
been unsatisfied concerning what they often see as a lack of lucidity and 
specifics in JOAs concerning the rights and duties of parties conducting 
joint operations. Conversely, oil and gas lawyers and landmen have 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Basic Energy Service, Inc. v. D-S-B Properties, Inc., 367. S.W.3d 254 (Tex. 
App. 2011, no pet.); Long v. Rim Operating, Inc., 345 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. App.—2011, pet. 
denied). 
 2. ERNEST SMITH & JACQUELINE WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 17.3(A) (1) 
(Matthew Bender 2007) (2d ed. 1998).  
 3. Id. 
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complained that even with the form aspect of the terms, negotiating a JOA 
for each drilling project still takes too long and is unresponsive to the need 
for quick operational action. Both complaints are at times correct, and when 
litigious disputes erupt among JOA signatories, the forms are open to 
numerous interpretations. 
The result of these interpretative disputes in the aggregate is that case 
law has, over time, construed almost every major provision of the JOA, 
although not necessarily consistently, which has helped to keep oil and gas 
professors busy writing articles and challenging students. Some of the 
provisions discussed in this paper appear in some of the Form JOAs but not 
in others or, at least, not in the same precise terms. This paper seeks to both 
list and detail some—but certainly not all—of the most common provisions 
encountered in the Form JOAs that have been shaped by case law. In order 
to make this exercise less tedious, the author has provided examples that 
describe a scenario and then invites you to speculate how a court might 
resolve the conflict.4 After each scenario, case law that is relevant or 
analogous to the scenario is briefly discussed.  
Because extensive coverage of all JOA-relevant case law would fill a 
textbook,5 I have taken selective liberty in picking topics believed to be the 
genesis of the greatest amount of litigation. I have avoided lengthy 
ruminations of case law background and the developmental history of 
certain clauses as the various JOA forms have progressed. My objective is 
to provide a primer (or reminder) on the effect of case law on the Form 
JOAs and on the pitfalls that may not be immediately recognizable to 
practitioners unfamiliar with the Form JOA. Finally, throughout this paper, 
I have cited articles that might prove useful to practitioners who desire a 
greater in-depth discussion. 
B. History of Joint Operations and Form JOAs 
 The need for JOAs began to arise in the early-mid 1900s for a number 
of reasons. Spacing and density conservation laws arose, requiring the 
pooling of leases. Also, as wells were drilled deeper and thus became more 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Each party name in the presented scenarios references a luminary in popular music, 
which also invites you to test yourself on your knowledge of rock and pop performers. This 
format was inspired by both (i) the 2014 Texas State Bar Environmental Law 
Superconference that used popular music as themes and (ii) the author’s friend Byron 
Hoffmann, rock musicologist. 
 5. For a textbook-sized article—perhaps the most complete article on case law and 
joint operation agreements see JOHN REEVES, Compendium of Cases Construing the Model 
Form Operation Agreement, 52 Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute, Chapter 11 (2006). 
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expensive, joint investment to spread risk became more appealing. As 
mineral ownership became more fragmented and, consequently, as more 
and different lessees found themselves sharing leaseholds over the same, 
overlapping, or adjacent tracts, joint operations became more necessary. In 
addition, as described below, concerns about joint-and-several liability 
arose. The owners of undivided mineral interests, and their lessees, found 
that some of the common law rules of co-tenancy and mining partnerships 
did not sit comfortably with their oil and gas development plans. 
At first, many operators had their own preferred form of operating 
agreement, leading to delay as negotiations and “form wars” occurred 
between potential co-developers. In the 1950s, starting in Oklahoma, 
industry negotiators, landmen, and lawyers began to conceive of a model 
form for joint operations.6 Eventually, the Ross Martin Company in Tulsa 
published the “Kraftbilt Form 610” JOA in 1956, the first widespread Form 
JOA.7 Approximately ten years later, the American Association of 
Petroleum Landmen (“AAPL”) assumed control of the 1956 form, 
renaming it the “AAPL Model Form 610 JOA,” (the “1956 Form”).8  
Descendants of the 1956 Form are now the most popular JOA forms in 
use.9 While one may encounter other JOA forms, most have evolved, in 
part, from one of the forms developed by the AAPL, including offshore 
domestic JOAs.10 “As a result, judicial and academic concepts developed in 
the context of one JOA or one dispute are increasingly viewed as generally 
applicable to all JOAs.”11 Nevertheless, as will be illustrated throughout 
this article, individual words and phrases make a difference. Thus, a small 
change in a JOA provision from one form to the next may fundamentally 
alter the substance and effect of the provision. 
The AAPL has promulgated several revisions of the 1956 form: the 1977 
AAPL 610 Form JOA (the “1977 Form”), in the 1982 AAPL 610 Form 
JOA (the “1982 Form”), and the 1989 AAPL 610 Form JOA (the “1989 
Form”).  
                                                                                                                 
 6. Paul Yale, The AAPL Operating Agreement and the Deadbeat Non-Operator, 
Proceedings of the 27th Annual Energy Law Institute for Attorneys and Landmen at page D-
5, South Texas College of Law, Houston, Aug. 27-28, 2014.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. American Association of Petroleum Landmen, http://www.landman.org/.  
 9. Gary Conine, Property Provisions of the Operating Agreement—Interpretation, 
Validity and Enforceability, 19 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1263, 1273-74 (1988).  
 10. Ernest Smith, The Future of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence, Joint Operating Agreement 
Jurisprudence, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 834, 835 (Summer 1994).  
 11. Id. 
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The 1989 Form was revised during the bleakness of the mid and late 
1980s, when oil prices sank, banks failed, and bankruptcies in the oil and 
gas business washed over upstream operations, resulting in parties 
defaulting on their financial and operational obligations. These events 
highlighted shortcomings with the first three form JOAs—namely deadbeat 
operators and non-operators.12 Hence, the 1989 Form contains expanded 
and additional provisions addressing defaulting parties, including advance 
payment requirements, suspended contractual rights of defaulting parties, 
and expanded non-consent penalties.13 The 1989 Form also simplified the 
operator-removal procedure and added another removal option for use 
when the operator fails in its financial obligations.  
The various AAPL Form JOAs are in such widespread use that 
experienced oil and gas practitioners have much of their general content 
committed to memory. Nevertheless, like any standardized form, Form 
JOAs do not contain provisions for every situation and not all provisions 
are necessarily acceptable to all JOA parties. Many “old hands” have their 
own customary changes that they make to each form as a matter of 
course.14 Customized provisions are usually the first provisions reviewed 
by potential counterparties and their counsel. 
By 2013, the horizontal drilling craze finally prompted the AAPL to 
revise its 1989 Form to address operational issues associated with 
horizontal drilling. This form, the “Horizontal Modifications” Form (the 
“Horz. Form”), is the 1989 Form modified, as necessary, to better address 
horizontal drilling.15 For example, the Horz. Form has added, revised, and 
supplemented several definitions to account for horizontal well drilling, 
such as the term “Deepen,” which has been supplemented to account for the 
possible extension of the lateral portion of a horizontal well. The Horz. 
Form does not respond to case law,16 but is essentially a stopgap form 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Yale, supra note 6. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See e.g. Christopher Kulander and Mark Mathews, Additional Provisions to Form 
Joint Operating Agreements, Oil, Gas & Energy Resources Law Section Report, State Bar of 
Texas, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2008. 
 15. See Michael Cooper, et al., A Form for All Directions: A.A.P.L.’s “New” 1989 
Horizontal Well JOA, Client Alert, Oct. 10, 2013, available at 
https://www.haynesboone.com/a-form-for-all-directions-aapls-new-1989-horizontal-well-
joa-10-10-2013/. 
 16. Interview with Michel Curry, Attorney, Henry Resources, LLC, Midland, Texas, 
and AAPL Form revision committee member (Oct. 28, 2014). 
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addressing new terminology and issues relating to horizontal well proposals 
and elections.17 This revision does not address coalbed methane operations.  
A new major revision of the 1989 Form is expected in the autumn of 
2015. This new version is being crafted by lawyers and landmen under the 
auspices of the AAPL. This process has been ongoing for several years.18 
The new form will include the new provisions for horizontal drilling but 
will also substantially revise the 1989 Form in light of case law and 
technological advances since publication of the 1989 Form.19  
II. Joint Operations Without a Joint Operating Agreement 
What happens when no JOA is in place? Joint operations without a JOA 
are generally a bad idea, but such operations still occur among legally 
unsophisticated parties, where tax considerations loom, after bankruptcy 
where one or more parties have rejected a JOA as an executory contract, or 
where other factors exist that require immediate drilling, such as drainage, 
imminent expiration of leases, or simple impatience. In recent years, some 
companies have been more willing to drill a well without a JOA—
apparently to maintain the confidentiality of their drilling techniques. 
Several co-ownership scenarios give rise to joint operations. If the 
mineral interest is owned by several parties or if some of these co-tenants 
lease to different companies, the legal doctrines involving co-tenancy will 
apply unless the parties enter into a JOA. What if one co-tenant mineral 
owner does not want development?  
Problem: Anderson owns a 1/10th working interest in Acres Wild. 
Anderson’s co-tenants, who are owners of the other 9/10ths working 
interest, drilled a well and began producing without his consent. Anderson 
sues for waste, trespass, and for 1/10th of the value of production (free of 
cost). How will the court rule?  
In Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, the court held that “[a 1/10th working 
interest owner] is entitled to an accounting from [the operator] Skelly 
Company for the market value of the oil produced less the reasonable and 
necessary expense of developing, extracting and marketing the same.”20 In 
most states, any co-owner may develop hydrocarbons on jointly owned 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. (The latest Form JOA has been likened by a couple practitioners to the oft-
delayed Chinese Democracy album by Guns N’ Roses.)  
 19. Id. 
 20. 2 F.2d 566, 574 (8th Cir. 1924—applying Oklahoma law). 
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lands without the consent of other co-owners. In such circumstance, the 
“operating” co-owner assumes the total risk of any dry holes, but must 
account to the other co-owners for the net profits of production—typically 
on a well-by-well basis,21 after recovering out of revenues the non-
operating co-owners’ pro-rata share of drilling, completion, and day-to-day 
operating costs.22 Under co-tenancy law, the non-drilling co-tenant is thus 
given a risk-free ride on the well and yet is entitled to its undivided share of 
any net profits. JOAs substantially modify this common law.  
If co-tenants jointly drill a well without a JOA, they risk being classified 
as a partnership or joint venture. A partnership or joint venture can arise as 
a matter of law even when the parties did not intend to form a partnership.23 
Among other concerns, a partnership or joint venture relationship makes the 
parties jointly and severally liable for all expenses and resulting liabilities 
of the partnership or joint venture. One of the biggest advantages of JOAs is 
that a well-drafted JOA contractually disclaims joint and several liability.  
Problem: Vinnie, Tony, and Ronnie each orally agreed to own a 
proportionate share in the proposed Wishing Well No. 1 in Roberts County, 
Texas. They agreed to share expenses and profits, and—again without a 
written agreement—chose Ronnie to be the operator. Ronnie intentionally 
drilled a directional well that bottomed beneath adjoining land owned by 
Ozzy. The well produced directly from Ozzy’s land for ten years, and the 
conversion of Ozzy’s oil was not discovered until the deviation of the well 
was measured after the Texas Railroad Commission shut in the well and 
completed a directional survey. During the civil trial for conversion, how 
might Ozzy and/or the state show that Vinnie, Tony, and Ronnie were 
partners or joint operators in light of the absence of a JOA?  
In State v. Harrington,24 the Texas Supreme Court found a mining 
partnership existed between defendants in the circumstances described 
above, opining,  
All of the elements of a mining partnership–joint ownership, 
joint operations, sharing of profits, community of interest and 
mutual agency representing the mining partnership in 
                                                                                                                 
 21. For example, if Well A is dry and Well B is a producer, the operating co-owner 
cannot deduct drilling costs for Well A from the profits due the non-operating co-owners 
from production from Well B.  
 22. See Cox v. Davidson, 397 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1965). 
 23. Ernest Smith, Duties and Obligations Owed by an Operator to Non-Operator 
Investors and Other Interest Owners, 32 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST., 12-1, 12-5 (1986). 
 24. 407 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966). 
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management and operation—were proved without dispute [… 
and the] record shows that each defendant made admissions 
conclusively establishing that an oral agreement was entered into 
before the well was drilled whereby they would own the lease 
proportionately and would share in the expenses and profits. It is 
immaterial that conveyances of interests to some of the partners 
were executed after the well was drilled. There was no written or 
oral agreement to limit the rights or duties of any one of the 
defendants so as to preclude liability, responsibility, control, 
operation or management of the lease.25  
Thus, the omission of a JOA with the disclaimer of a joint venture and 
mining partnership, almost guarantees that the three parties in the above 
fact pattern, will be jointly and severally liable for the directional drilling. 
Damages are likely to be calculated from the onset of production because 
the conversion was not discoverable until the Railroad Commission ordered 
a directional survey. Moreover, a well-drafted JOA may preclude a suit by 
Ozzy against the non-operator parties.  
Problem: Daltrey Gas approached Entwistle Oil for the purpose of 
forming a partnership for the development of the Money Disposal Project. 
Both orally agreed to the partnership, on the condition that Entwistle Oil 
would supply the pipe and be allowed to oversee the completion operations, 
which were to be done with Entwistle’s own workover rig. They further 
agreed that Daltrey Gas would be the operator and front all expenses and 
that Entwistle Oil would reimburse its 50% share to Daltrey Gas upon 
completion of the well. Both parties were aware of the fact that in the 
eventuality of a dry hole, the well would have to be plugged and 
abandoned. Entwistle Oil put Daltrey Gas in contact with Mr. Moon, its 
agent. With Mr. Moon overseeing the operation, Daltrey Gas began 
running casing. Shortly thereafter, drilling was completed, and Daltrey Gas 
requested Entwistle Oil’s workover rig from Mr. Moon. Mr. Moon refused 
to provide the workover rig and refused any more involvement with the 
well. Daltrey Gas then rented a workover rig and completed a dry hole. 
Daltrey Gas plugged and abandoned the well. Entwistle Oil refused to pay 
its share, arguing that it had withdrawn from the partnership. Will the 
court find a partnership existed?  
                                                                                                                 
 25. Id. at 477.  
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In Tabco Exploration v. Tadlock Pipe & Equip.,26 the court found that “a 
partnership was created by an oral agreement” and that the party in 
Entwistle Oil’s position was liable for half of the expenses incurred by the 
partnership.27  
Other reasons lend themselves to utilization of JOAs. First, absent a JOA 
allowing for non-consent penalties (or perhaps absent a compulsory pooling 
order), the operator will not receive non-consent penalties from a party that 
refuses to participate in a subsequent well. Second, Form JOAs typically 
allow for attorney’s fee if litigation is necessary to collect a debt arising 
from work done under the JOA. Third, JOAs typically provide for liens and 
other methods to recuperate losses against a signatory that does not pay its 
share of operation costs. 
A. Incomplete and Unexecuted JOAs and Ancillary Documents 
The author continues to encounter incompletely executed JOAs, JOAs 
missing attachments and exhibits, and AMI and Recording Memorandum 
that have not been recorded or even contemplated. Such miscues breed 
litigation. The JOA and its ancillary documents, such as the Recording 
Memorandum and, if present, any AMI Agreement should be signed by all 
parties and recorded as necessary. Some JOAs fail to specify what ancillary 
documents and exhibits are part or not part of the JOA and also fail to 
specify which documents control in the event of a conflict. 
Problem: Ferry Production, operator, along with non-operators Eno 
Engineering and Manzanera Management, executed a 1982 Form JOA 
encompassing leases over the Bogus Prospect. The JOA was executed by 
the three parties and Article II stated that an AMI Agreement was attached 
to the JOA as Exhibit B. At the time of execution (also the effective date) of 
the JOA, the AMI Agreement had not been completed and was included in 
the JOA several months later, blank signature lines and all. A couple of 
years later, various successor interest owners got into a squabble over the 
application of the AMI Agreement to some newly-acquired leases. One 
acquirer argued that the AMI Agreement did not apply because it wasn’t 
included in the JOA, was never executed, and was not completed at the time 
of execution of the JOA. Does the AMI Agreement apply to the successor 
interest owners?  
                                                                                                                 
 26. 617 So. 2d 606, 607-612 (La. Ct. App. 1993). 
 27. Id. at 608. 
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A separate, unsigned, document must be “sufficiently related” to the 
“main” document (for example, the JOA) for which incorporation is 
sought.28 This typically means that the main agreement must expressly 
reference the unsigned one. Furthermore, the unsigned document for which 
incorporation is sought should be complete at the time of execution of the 
main agreement so that the statute of frauds can be satisfied. Oral testimony 
or a claim of estoppel (which is a defense, not a cause of action) may not be 
enough to warrant unsigned, non-existent, or incomplete agreement 
incorporation.29 
III. Relationship of the Parties and Form JOA Interpretation 
A. Standards of Conduct Required of the Operator 
The exact standard of conduct that an operator owes to the other parties 
in the JOA has been long debated. Each of the Form JOA models has 
attempted to define the obligations of the various parties. The most 
important portions of the 1989 Form that speak to the duty of the operator 
to the non-operators are in Articles V, VI.G, and VII.A.  
A number of cases have addressed the question of whether the operator 
owes a fiduciary duty to the non-operators. The opening paragraph of 
Article V of the 1989 Form specifically rejects this standard. In place of the 
agency principals previously attributed to the operator, the 1989 Form 
labels the operator an independent contractor and then holds the operator to 
the standard of a reasonable prudent operator. 
 In contrast, earlier forms did not expressly repudiate an agency 
relationship, define the operator as an independent contractor, or require 
parties to act in good faith. Thus, courts still find agency and fiduciary 
relationships in older forms in particular circumstances. While operators 
typically want to avoid owing a fiduciary duty to non-operators, the mere 
existence of an agreement between an operator and non-operator is not 
sufficient to avoid this duty. Even with a written agreement courts will 
consider whether the agreement or the conduct of the parties nevertheless 
creates a partnership, joint venture, or agency relationship that may trigger 
a fiduciary duty. Courts will generally find a joint venture where the parties 
have (1) a community of interest, (2) an agreement to share profits, (3) an 
agreement to share losses, and (4) a mutual right of control or management 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Crowder v. Tri-C Resources, Inc. 821 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 
1991, no writ. 
 29. Id. 
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of the enterprise. Oftentimes, the key issue is whether the venturers had the 
mutual right to control or management of the enterprise.  
Problem: Hall Oil Co., Oates Gas Co. and others have entered into an 
agreement, designating Hall as the operator. After a disagreement over the 
way Hall Oil Co. operated the Maneater No. 1 well, Oates and the other 
non-operators removed Hall as operator. Later, Oates sued Hall for fraud 
and breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to the terms of the agreement, which 
identified the parties as “Joint Venturers” and allowed the parties to vote 
on “Joint Venture business.” What duty does Hall owe Oates?  
In Russell v. French & Assocs.,30 an operator of oil and gas wells, that 
had been previously removed and replaced by the non-operators, brought an 
appeal against a judgment declaring that the operator had committed fraud, 
misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty against non-operator 
investors. The court found that a joint venture existed between the parties 
and that the operator owed a fiduciary duty. The pivotal issue was whether 
the parties had an agreement for mutual management. The court found that 
this element was satisfied because non-operators had a right to vote on 
enterprise matters and that they had exercised authority to remove the 
operator. Mutual management completed the necessary elements for the 
finding of a joint venture, thus triggering a fiduciary duty. 
Problem: Simon Oil entered into a JOA, as the operator, with Garfunkel 
Gas, a non-operator, covering the Fakin’ It Field. Under the agreement, if 
the non-operator failed to take its production in kind or otherwise dispose 
of it, the operator is allowed to sell the non-operator’s production share 
and recover from the proceeds the monies necessary to cover the non-
operator’s proportionate share of the costs of production. Later, after some 
alleged stalling during production and stealing of funds, Garfunkel Gas 
sued for breach of a fiduciary duty and other acts of misconduct related to 
Simon Oil having sold Garfunkel’s production share. What factors will the 
court consider?  
In Reserve Oil, Inc. v. Dixon,31 the federal 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, 
considering a project in Oklahoma, held that the 1956 Form, and through its 
description of the later Model Forms to the time of the case, 1983, 
established a “trustee-type” relationship that required “fair dealings.” The 
court found that the operator had complete control over the non-operator’s 
                                                                                                                 
 30. 709 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 31. 711 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1983). 
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production share when the non-operator failed to take its share. However, 
the court did not find a “general agency relationship” as that notion was 
“specifically disavowed” in the 1956 Form.  
Article VI.G of the 1989 Form permits the operator to sell or buy any of 
the production from the “Contract Area”32 that the non-operator chooses 
not to take. Any such sale is to be “in a manner commercially reasonable” 
under the circumstances, but operator has not duty to share an existing 
market or obtain a price equal to that received in any existing market.  
Problem: Blackmore Petroleum, Lord Oil, and others execute a 1977 
Form JOA. Specifically, Blackmore is the operator and Lord Oil is a non-
operator of the Lazy Unit. A dispute erupted over the prices Blackmore 
Petroleum received for the sale of production from the Contract Area under 
the terms of a gas purchase contract. Should the outcome hinge on the legal 
relationship between Blackmore and Lord? 
In Johnston v. American Cometra, Inc.,33 the court held that the operator 
had acted as an agent of the non-operators in entering into a gas purchase 
agreement on behalf of itself and the non-operators. The court quoted 
Professor Ernest Smith: “[T]he act of selling for another implies a 
principal-agent relationship. An operator who markets gas on behalf of non-
operators may have a duty to protect the rights of such non-operators in the 
event of a gas purchase.”34 The agency relationship imposed a fiduciary 
duty on the operator regarding its actions in marketing the non-operator’s 
gas. Nevertheless, the operator had an express contractual right under the 
JOA to cease marketing the non-operator’s share of production at any 
time.35 
A similar result occurred where the operator sold the non-operator’s gas 
through a pipeline subsidiary. In Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Long Trusts,36 a 
court held that a pipeline company—owned by the operator—was the alter 
ego of the operator and the agent of the non-operator because it had sold 
gas in the name of its parent company. In both Atlantic Richfield and 
Johnston, the courts apparently disregarded the exculpatory provisions of 
                                                                                                                 
 32. “Contract Area” is defined in the 1989 Form as “…all of the lands, Oil and Gas 
Lease and/or Oil and Gas Interests intended to be developed and operated for Oil and Gas 
purposes under this agreement.” This definition will be used throughout this paper. 
 33. 837 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.—Austin, 1992, writ denied). 
 34. See Smith, supra note 23.  
 35. See e.g., The Long Trusts v. Griffin, 222 S.W.3d 412 (Tex. 2006). 
 36. 860 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. App.—Texarkana, 1993). 
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the pre-1989 Forms as not being relevant to operator’s sale of the non-
operator’s share of production. 
Atlantic Richfield stands as an exception to the general notion that Form 
JOAs do not give rise to an agency relationship. Read narrowly, Atlantic 
Richfield establishes that, in Texas, an agency relationship results when an 
operator sells a non-operator’s share of gas. While the court pulls up short 
of imposing a true fiduciary duty on the operator, it appears to conclude 
that, when an operator sells a non-operator’s gas, a sort of “fiduciary lite” 
relationship is established that obligates the operator to provide the non-
operator with an account of gas sales and to avoid both conflicts of interests 
and acting adversely to the non-operator in its role as operator/seller. One 
commentator has noted that some other states calibrate the relationship 
between the operator and non-operators differently than Texas.37 
B. Liability Among JOA Parties—Generally 
Importantly, JOAs are intended to achieve for the parties several 
liability, rather than joint liability. Liabilities for JOA parties are essentially 
limited to each party’s investment as opposed to joint liability as in the case 
of partnership.38 The operator’s role is that of an independent contractor 
and not a partner of the non-operators.39 In order to facilitate this separation 
of liability, delegation of managerial authority to the operator for 
exploration and development within the Contract Area is a main focus of 
the JOA. The key is that the non-operators’ lack of operational control 
negates the joint control required for a joint venture or mining partnership: 
Problem: Page, as operator, and Plant, Jones, and Bonham, as non-
operators, entered into a JOA. The JOA provided that the operator had to 
secure the approval of the non-operators for any expense over $2500.00. 
Plant, Jones, and Bonham were regularly billed for their proportionate 
share of expenses and always paid Page as provided in the JOA. Page 
hired Crunge Drilling, Inc. and several other contractors both before and 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Allen Cummings, The Joint Operating Agreement—the Basics, Chapter 4: 
Proceedings of Oil, Gas and Energy Resources 101 CLE at 8, State Bar of Texas, Houston, 
Oct. 17, 2012. 
 38. John Lowe, Some Recurring Issues in Operating Agreements and What AAPL’s 
Drafting Committee Might Do About Them, 60 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. ___ (2014)(in 
press). 
 39. See Howard Boigon and Christine Murphy, Liabilities of Nonoperating Mineral 
Interest Owners, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 161 (1980) citing Mikel Drilling Co. v. Dunkin, 
318 P.2d 435 (Okla. 1957); Dana v. Searight, 47 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1931); and Riss v. 
Harvey, 354 P2d 594 (Colo. 1960)). 
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after entering into the JOA. After joint operations commenced, however, 
Page filed for bankruptcy. Crunge and several other creditors to the now 
bankrupt Page sued Plant, Jones, and Bonham arguing that the JOA 
parties were partners. Will the non-operators be liable to the creditors?  
Even before the advent of the Form JOAs, Texas courts recognized that 
the elements of a joint venture could be avoided through the lack of joint 
control. In Luling Oil & Gas Co. v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co.,40 the Texas 
Supreme Court observed: “Joint owners of an oil and gas lease may, 
without forming a partnership, contract for the operation of the leases by 
one of them…without creating a joint adventure or a mining partnership.”41 
In Ayco Dev. Corp. v. G.E.T. Serv. Co.,42 the Texas Supreme Court defined 
the basic principal that “defendants … as a matter of law … are not liable 
as joint venturers … [because] the unambiguous contracts and the proof 
show no more than that the Ayco defendants invested in the venture, but 
had and exercised no right to participate in the control or operation of the 
venture.”43 
Earlier, in Berchelmann v. Western Co.,44 the Texas Court of Appeals in 
El Paso presented an eloquent and nuanced explanation that the “very 
operating agreements themselves, wherein appellants were designated as 
the ‘non-operators’ and [the now bankrupt company] as the ‘operator’ do 
not contain the basic elements of sharing of liability, control, risk and 
profits, along with the elements of agency, necessary to constitute a 
partnership or mining partnership. It is our opinion that the relationship here 
concerned was…a working agreement between [the now bankrupt 
company] as operator and appellants as non-operators. The latter were to 
contribute their proportionate shares of the expenses incurred and 
controlled by [the bankrupt operator] which, by definite agreement as 
represented by the written instruments and other documentary evidence, 
was in control of both the drilling and production. We see no valid legal 
reason to hold the appellants liable for debts incurred by the operator. The 
operator used its own credit, made its own transactions, and finally wound 
up being adjudicated bankrupt.” 
                                                                                                                 
 40. 191 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1945). 
 41. Id. at 718. 
 42. 616 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. 1981). 
 43. Id. at 186.  
 44. 363 S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
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Two commentators have noted that delegation of operational control to 
one party may work to shield the non-operating co-owners from liability.45 
A few jurisdictions have found in favor of creditors or parties seeking 
personal injury or property claims. In these cases, the claimants tried to find 
the crucial element of control in the provisions of the JOA that give certain 
limited decision-making rights to the non-operators, such as the clause that 
requires consent of all non-operators before the operator can plug and 
abandon the Initial Well.46 In Lavy v. Pitts,47 a workman who was injured 
when natural gas that was leaking from a well exploded, sought—albeit 
unsuccessfully—to find the requisite element of non-operator control in the 
JOA provision authorizing removal of the operator if it failed to conduct 
operations in a good and workmanlike manner. 
 Even in jurisdictions whose courts view the JOA’s provisions as 
negating a mining partnership or joint venture, a non-operator who 
disregards the terms of the agreement and takes an active role in the 
conduct of operations could be held jointly liable for the operator’s debts or 
tort liabilities. In contrast, if the JOA is expressly made subject to some 
other contract, such as a farmout that grants partial managerial rights to a 
non-operator, the non-operator may be deemed to have sufficient control 
over the operations, even though it has never exercised such rights. 
1. Limitations of Leasehold Burdens 
Form JOAs typically cap the leasehold burdens—all types of royalty—
that will be carried jointly by all the signatories of the JOA. Thus, if one 
particular lease included in a Contract Area is subject to a burdensome 
royalty share, the lessee of that particular leasehold will exclusively pay the 
overage between the base maximum set forth in the JOA and the actual 
royalty burden. For example, Line 17 of the 1989 Form’s Contract Area 
description provides the ceiling on the leasehold burdens that will be 
carried jointly by all the members of the JOA. The portion of any burden 
above this ceiling will be carried exclusively by the party who created it 
and its successors. For example, assume that Line 17 of the 1989 Form is 
filled in such that the obligations will be jointly applied up to 15.0% (such 
as a 12.5% landowner’s royalty and 2.5% overriding royalty). If a member 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Boigon and Murphy, supra note 39 at 158. 
 46. “Initial Well” is defined in the 1989 Form as “…the well required to be drilled by 
the parties hereto as provided in Article VI.A.” This definition, that of the first well drilled 
under the JOA that all the signatories of the JOA agree to participate in, will be used 
throughout this paper. 
 47. 29 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2000, pet. denied). 
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of the agreement contributes a lease with a total burden of 19.0%, then the 
4.0% burden over the 15.0% limit would be borne solely by the participant 
who created that burden and not by the other members of the agreement.  
2. Tax Considerations 
JOAs provide that each party owns its interests separately for tax 
purposes. While the tax results are similar to those for partners in a 
partnership, mining partnerships are often avoided for tax reasons. The 
mining partnership is a separate entity for tax purposes, perhaps resulting in 
double or even triple taxation, with taxes being levied at a partnership level, 
a corporate level (through partnership distributions), and a personal level 
(via reported income for dividends).48 If a single operation with multiple 
owners is set up as a stand-alone corporation, not only may double taxation 
occur, but participants may be unable to take advantage of losses for 
taxation purposes.49  
C. Operator Authority  
The JOA operator is usually a working interest holder and often times 
has the largest share of the total property comprising the Contract Area. The 
operator is not paid for taking the position but can often reap “off the 
books” benefits such as work for its employees, use of its equipment, and 
overhead payments as allowed by the JOA and its accounting exhibit.50 In 
practice, the operator also benefits from being the operational manager 
because it has control of day-to-day operations.    
1. Operator’s Ability to Set Rates 
 Article V.D.1 of the 1989 Form provides that all wells drilled in the 
Contract Area are to be drilled at rates prevailing in the region. The JOA 
allows the operator to use its own equipment and assets in operations it 
conducts on its own provided that the rates charged by the operator must be 
comparable with the prevailing rates in the area and must be agreed upon in 
writing before the commencement of operations. Furthermore, all services 
provided and material furnished by affiliates of the operator must be at 
competitive rates agreed upon in writing and following the customs and 
standards of the petroleum industry.  
                                                                                                                 
 48. Yale, supra note 6. 
 49. See Charles Galvin, The “Ought” and “Is” of Oil and Gas Taxation, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1441, 1495-96 (1960). 
 50. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2015
18 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 1 
 
 
Problem: Meisner Oil, operator under a 1989 Form, drilled an Initial 
Well that ended up being located 630 feet from the well site described in the 
JOA and other notices. Non-operators Henley, Frey, and Leadon discover 
this error and further discover that this deviation has resulted in increased 
costs. Are the non-operators liable for the costs? 
In Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp,51 the court held that an expert’s 
opinion that “the costs of site preparation would increase four or five times 
due to the change in location” was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
finding that the non-operator was not liable for its proportionate share of the 
increased cost of preparation. The court’s holding was dependent upon the 
fact that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding of gross 
negligence.52 Note, however, that the threshold for gross negligence is often 
difficult for non-operators to reach. 
Problem: Non-operators Stradlin, Adler, and McKagan entered into a 
JOA designating Rose Oil as operator. The agreement provided that the 
non-operators were to pay 15.0% of the costs Rose Oil incurred in drilling 
the initial well. The agreement also provided that Rose was to commence 
drilling the Initial Well on or before December 31, 1991. On December 1, 
1991 Stradlin, Adler and McKagan paid Rose the estimated 15.0% of the 
costs of drilling the Initial Well, amounting to $33,000 each. Rose did not 
begin drilling until January 24, 1992, and 15.0% of the cost of drilling the 
well ended up costing them $48,000 each, nearly 50% more than the 
estimated cost. Stradlin, Adler, and McKagan refused to pay, citing the 
delay. Rose Oil sued for the additional costs. What result?  
In Argos Resources, Inc. v. May Petroleum, Inc.,53 the court explained 
“the operating agreement in the present case falls under the two general 
rules that time is ordinarily not of the essence and that a [operator] need 
only prove substantial performance to recover on his contract. We conclude 
further that time was not of the essence in the operating agreement before 
us and that [operator] consequently did not forfeit its rights under the 
agreement when it failed to begin drilling on or before [the date specified in 
the JOA”]. 
More recently, in a case involving a 1989 Form, Shell Rocky Mountain 
Prod., LLC v. Ultra Resources, Inc.,54 10th Circuit Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                                 
 51. 648 S.W.2d 316, 324 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1982, writ ref’d). 
 52. Id. at 323. 
 53. 693 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 54. 415 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. Wyo. 2005). 
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considered a dispute over a previous settlement agreement wherein Ultra, a 
non-operator, sought damages against the operator, Shell, which it alleged 
had breached the provision requiring that drilling and operating costs either 
be based on competitive bids or, if incurred by the Operator, that they “not 
exceed the prevailing rates in the area.” Specifically, the duty provision of 
Article V.D.1 of the 1989 Form provides: 
Competitive Rates and Use of Affiliates: All wells drilled on the 
Contract Area shall be drilled on a competitive contract basis at 
the usual rates prevailing in the area. If it so desires, Operator 
may employ its own tools and equipment in the drilling of wells, 
but its charges therefor shall not exceed the prevailing rates in 
the area and the rate of such charges shall be agreed upon by the 
parties in writing before drilling operations are commenced, and 
such work shall be performed by Operator under the same terms 
and conditions as are customary and usual in the area in 
contracts of independent contractors who are doing work of a 
similar nature. 
Ultra alleged that Shell, acting as operator, breached the competitive rate 
provision of Article V.D.1 by charging drilling costs to the non-operating 
working interest owners in excess of the prevailing rates in the area. Shell’s 
principal defense was based on Article V.A, which provided that the 
operator “shall conduct all such operations in a good and workmanlike 
manner, but it shall have no liability as Operator to the other parties for 
losses sustained or liaiblity incurred, except such as may result from gross 
negligence or willful misconduct.” Shell argued that this provision absolved 
it of all liability unless Ultra could show gross negligence or wilfull 
misconduct on Shell’s part. 
The Tenth Circuit rejected Shell’s arguments, relying on an article by 
commentator Gary Conine.55 Conine argues that the exculpatory language 
in Article V.A. limiting liability to gross negligence and willful misconduct 
applies only to the operator’s failure to conduct operations in a “good and 
workmanlike manner,” or its tortious conduct. It is inapplicable to claims 
that the operator has breached express contractual provisions or has failed 
to perform its administrative duties. As we shall see, this conclusion is not 
necessarily applicable to all of the Form JOAs. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 55. Gary Conine, “The Prudent Operator Standard: Applications Beyond the Oil and 
Gas Lease,” 41 Nat. Resources J. 23 (2001). 
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2. Contact with Third Parties 
According to Article V.D.1. of the 1989 Form, and unless otherwise 
provided for in customized or additional provisions of the JOA or other 
attachments, an operator is free to contract with any party, subject to the 
reasonable and prudent operator standard. However, Article V.D.1., 
requires that “wells drilled in the Contract Area shall be drilled on a 
competitive contract basis at the usual rates prevailing in the area.” Article 
V.D.1. also allows the operator to perform the work itself and to use its own 
tools; however, operator’s “charges shall be agreed upon by the parties in 
writing before drilling operations are commenced.” In addition, the clause 
also provides that “work shall be performed by operator under the same 
terms and conditions as are customary and usual in the area in contracts of 
independent contractors who are doing work of a similar nature.”  
Problem: Crosby Contracting, Stills Gas, and Nash Oil, working interest 
owners, executed a JOA. Crosby was designated operator. Crosby solicited 
bids to drill the Initial Well as required by Article V.D.1 of the 1989 Form 
(“All wells drilled on the Contract Area shall be drilled on a competitive 
contract basis at the usual rates prevailing in the area.”). The bidding 
invitation specified that the drilling contract be priced on a footage basis. 
Several companies returned bids, many of which were either calculated on 
a day-rate or a turn-key basis. Only one of the returned bids was submitted 
on a footage basis. Crosby hired one of the drilling contractors who bid on 
a day-rate basis. Transportation of the rig to the drill site was an additional 
cost. The contractor drilled the well using a workover rig, which increased 
the drilling time compared to a conventional drilling rig, adding more to 
the costs. The well was a dry hole. In addition, the bills sent by Crosby to 
Stills and Nash considerably eclipsed the cost estimate. Stills and Nash 
refused to pay. During the ensuing litigation, Stills and Nash admitted that 
they owe something, but not the full amount reflected in Crosby’s bill. How 
much will they be charged? 
In Haas v. Gulf Coast Natural Gas Co.,56 the court reversed and 
remanded the trial court’s award of damages to the operator due to 
insufficient evidence to show that the well was drilled “on a competitive 
contract basis.” Supporting this conclusion was the fact that the operator 
awarded the contract on a day-rate basis when the written estimate 
circulated by the operator and signed by the non-operators called for the 
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well to be drilled on a footage basis.57 However, the appellate court did not 
suggest that the non-operators owed nothing for the work that was 
performed.58 
D. Liability to JOA Creditors 
Typically, as in Article V.A of the 1989 Form, the operator is provided 
the exclusive right and duty to contract for material and services for the 
Contract Area and is generally exclusively liable for payment. If the 
operator fails to pay or become insolvent, the creditors have attempted to 
hold non-operators liable. 
Problem: Lessee and operator Tyler Oil decided to hire Perry’s P-waves 
to conduct seismic reflection operations on one of the leaseholds covered 
by a JOA. Tyler Oil solicited the non-operators for approval and—getting 
that through a unanimous vote according to the terms of the JOA—
collected the prorata share of the seismic survey from each of the non-
operators. During the seismic data gathering, however, financial Tyler Oil 
finds itself in financial trouble, forcing a bankruptcy filing. Perry’s P-
Waves sues the non-operators to recover for the amount unpaid, arguing 
that all the non-operators were liable for the joint operations contracted for 
by Tyler Oil. Can it collect?   
In Blocker Exploration Co. v. Frontier Exploration, Inc.,59 the operator 
entered into an agreement with a seismic company for the performance of 
seismic acquisition work. When operator failed to make full payment and 
filed for bankruptcy, the seismic company brought suit against a non-
operator for the remaining amount due, alleging that a mining partnership 
existed between the operator and non-operator. The trial court granted 
defendant non-operator’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that 
an essential element of a mining partnership – joint operations – was 
missing under the JOA. 
The Court first noted that, in the absence of active participation by the 
non-operator in conducting the operations, there must follow an 
examination of the pertinent operating agreement to see if it gives the non-
operators a right to participate in management or control of operations. 
Under the agreement in Blocker, the various rights given the non-operator, 
such as the right to receive information and to go non-consent at various 
stages of the project, were held not rise to the level of control required for a 
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finding of a mining partnership. Blocker illustrates why an operating 
agreement is essential for the protection of non-operators from creditors. In 
the absence of an agreement delegating authority to the operator, the non-
operating participants can probably be held liable for unpaid expenses due 
creditors under a mining partnership theory. Creditors are normally 
subrogated to the operator’s claims against non-operators who have failed 
to pay their proportionate share of drilling, operating and related costs.  
E. Form Interpretation and Deleted Language 
 Parties utilizing Form JOAs can remove discrete portions of the form 
language. The Forms, which are available through the AAPL as a 
proprietary electronic and printable document, show by strikethrough any 
deletion, contrasting them to documents compiled by personal computers, 
whereon the users typically remove all deleted portions when compiling the 
final contract. Deleted portions of Form JOAs can provide insight into the 
intent of the parties. 
Problem: Valory Petroleum and Schon Oil executed a 1989 Form 
covering the Troubled Prospect. Later a dispute erupted regarding whether 
the JOA was meant to include a gas balancing agreement. Valory 
Petroleum claimed that no such agreement was included in the JOA even 
though Schon Oil signed a gas balancing agreement (while Valory 
Petroleum did not) and even though evidence arising from discovery 
showed that the parties had conducted and completed negotiations to craft 
the alleged gas balancing agreement. Article II of the JOA, however, 
contained a list of exhibits to the JOA and Exhibit “E”—the lettered exhibit 
set aside for a possible gas balancing agreement—is struck through. If 
parole evidence is allowed to be considered by the court, can the fact that 
Exhibit “E” was struck through be introduced as proof that no gas 
balancing agreement was intended to be attached to the JOA?   
In Houston Exploration Co. v. Wellington Underwriting Agencies, Inc.,60 
the Texas Supreme Court considered whether deleted provisions of a form 
contract can be used to help interpret the contract and intent of the parties. 
Offshore Specialty Fabricators and Houston Exploration were part of a 
group constructing an offshore drilling platform in the Gulf of Mexico. 
They hired Tysers International Insurance & Reinsurance Brokers to help 
them obtain property damage insurance to cover platform construction. 
Tysers, in turn, negotiated with Wellington Underwriting Agencies. The 
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negotiations involved striking through various provisions in a form 
“WELCAR 2001 Offshore Construction Project Policy.” The form, as 
altered, with the deletions visible became the operative insurance policy. 
Offshore Specialty Fabricators and Houston Exploration later submitted 
a claim to the insurance company for damage to the platform incurred 
during construction. This claim included amounts incurred for keeping 
repair vessels on standby by during rough weather. Wellington paid the 
property damage portion of the claim but denied the standby claim, noting 
that Paragraph 13 of the form policy, which was struck through, would have 
expressly covered the standby costs. The claimants sued, seeking to recover 
the unpaid weather-related standby portion of the claim. The trial court 
found that the stricken language was not part of the form contract, so 
considering it would be a violation of the parol evidence rule. The trial 
court also found that the non-struck portions of the form contract, which 
included blanket language providing coverage against “all risks,” was 
unambiguous.  
The court of appeals reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Both 
courts noted the struck language in the form policy that would have 
expressly covered the standby claim. The Supreme Court first opined that 
the parol evidence rule “does not prohibit consideration of surrounding 
circumstances that inform, rather than vary from or contradict, the contract 
text.”61 Furthermore, after the Court noted that “[t]he manner in which the 
insurance policy in this case was negotiated … is crucial to understanding 
its terms,”62 the Supreme Court pointed out that while the signatories did 
not draft the form contract text, they excluded certain risks by striking 
through language. 
While the claimants argued that the deleted text was irrelevant to 
interpreting the contract, the court held that this argument “not only ignores 
but distorts the negotiation process.”63 The Court cited two prior Texas 
Supreme Court opinions, each holding that deletions to a form contract 
were significant in the contract’s interpretation.64 While the claimants 
believed that deletions in a form contract should be considered the same as 
deletions in drafts versions of non-form contracts, the Court responded that, 
“the law has long recognized that changes in a printed form must be 
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 62. Id. at 470. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. citing Gibson v. Turner, 294 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. 1956) (concerning an oil and gas 
lease); Pipe Line Co. v. Dwyer, 374 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. 1964) (concerning a pipeline 
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accorded special weight in construing the instrument”65 The majority also 
wrote that, “[i]t may be that deletions in drafts indicate the parties’ intent in 
the final agreement, but we need not decide that issue here.”66 Therefore, 
Houston Exploration—while not involving a Form JOA—seemingly 
provides a limitation on the parol evidence rule with regards to Form JOAs: 
struck-through language will be noteworthy in interpreting the meaning of 
the remaining language. 
IV. Authorization for Expenditures (“AFEs”)  
While JOAs are mainly agreements under which the signatories jointly 
develop oil and gas leases, at least one commentator has pointed out that 
Form JOAs endure as a means to restrain an operator from taking advantage 
of its position and of the other parties.67 Because all JOA parties contribute 
money to fund joint operations, the JOA and its accounting exhibit address 
how costs are to be contained and how the operator can be assured of 
securing each parties’ share of costs. Generally, the operator is not 
supposed to suffer a loss or gain a profit by reason of its operator status. 
Rather, the operator’s cost exposure is limited to its participating interest 
share in the Contract Area. The JOA describes the recourse that signatories 
have against any party that defaults on its obligations—setting out remedies 
for operators against non-operators—and vice versa.  
A. Consent to Operations Clauses and AFEs Generally 
Joint operations can consist of drilling, exploration, deepening, 
sidetracking, and other such operations. These operations are commonly 
preceded by circulation of an “Authorization for Expenditure” (“AFE”). 
AFEs are described in the more recent Form JOAs. 
AFEs can serve as ballots that indicate whether a party to a JOA will join 
in a proposed operation. Such voting arises out of the need for parties of the 
JOA to propose operations and for other JOA parties to either join or not. 
Most JOAs include a “nonconsent” provision that any party can invoke 
with respect to all operations other than those connected with the Initial 
Well and in some other special circumstances. AAPL Form JOAs provide 
that participants have a specified number of days (typically either 30 or 60, 
depending which form is being used) in which to respond to the proposal 
for additional operations, and that a party that does not respond within the 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 472. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Yale, supra note 6 at D-3.  
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specified period is deemed to have opted to go “non-consent.” The JOAs 
further provide that the party making the proposal will commence work on 
the proposed operations within a specified period after the expiration of the 
notice period.  
 JOAs typically provide that parties going non-consent do not have to 
pay for operations in which they are not participating. On the other hand, if 
the operation is a success, the parties that participated in the operation are 
then allowed to recover their actual costs for the operation, and then an 
amount, as previously decided in the JOA as an expressed percentage—
typically an integer multiple of the drilling and completion costs and 
generally between 200% to 500% of the costs of drilling and completion—
is reached. This penalty is to prevent risk-free “free riders” from get 
unencumbered profits without assuming the same risks as the consenting 
parties for conducting a particular operation.68 If the AFE was not sent 
under the appropriate circumstances, as defined in the JOA, and a non-
operator is subsequently charged a non-consent penalty, then the non-
operator may have wrongfully lost money. 
B. Consent to Operations Clauses and Co-tenancy 
Despite very clear language in the older versions of the Form JOAs that 
certain operations were prohibited without the consent of all the parties in 
the operating agreement, courts in Texas have ruled such articles do not 
modify the parties’ co-tenancy rights and the provision’s result was simply 
to protect non-consenters from being charged for operations exceeding the 
stated minimum. Consider the following case, keeping in mind the 
consequences of using older vintage Form JOAs:  
Problem: Hetfield Oil was the operator and Ulrich Gas a non-operator 
under the terms of a 1982 Form. Hetfield Oil proposed that the Contract 
Area should be unitized and, subsequently, a well that was capable of 
producing several hundred barrels of oil a day was to be converted into an 
injection well for waterflood operations. Ulrich Gas thought that the move 
was hasty and that the well targeted for conversion should remain a 
producer. Ulrich Gas therefore objected to the proposal, bringing a claim 
after Hetfield Oil ignored Ulrich Gas’ objection and converted the well. 
In court, Ulrich Gas argued that if a well is producing in paying 
quantities, no operations can be conducted on it that would halt such 
production unless all the interest owners consented. In support of this, 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See, e.g. Beckham Res., Inc. v. Mantle Res., L.L.C., (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 
Feb. 25, 2010, pet. denied) (mem.op.). 
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Ulrich Gas points to two provisions in the 1982 Form. The first, VII.D.2 
“Limitation of Expenditures” provision, states: 
“Without the consent of all parties, no well shall be reworked or 
plugged back except a well reworked or plugged back pursuant 
to the provisions of Article VI.B.2.”69  
The second, Article VII.D.3 “Expenditures and Liability of the Parties” of 
the 1982 Form states:  
“Without the consent of all parties, Operator shall not undertake 
any single project reasonably estimated to require an expenditure 
in excess of _______ Dollars ($______) except in connection 
with a well, the drilling, reworking, deepening, completing, 
recompleting or plugging back of which has been previously 
authorized by, or pursuant to, this agreement;…”  
How should a court interpret these provisions?  
In Cone v. Fagadau,70 the Texas Court of Appeals in Eastland apparently 
focused on the co-tenant relationship instead of the operating agreement’s 
modification of it. Regarding Article VII.D.3, the court opined: 
“The relationship between Cone and the other working interest 
owners of the contact area was that of co-tenants of the various 
leaseholds which comprise the contact area, a co-tenant has the 
right to extract minerals from common property without first 
obtaining the consent of his co-tenants. …If a co-tenant owning 
a small interest in the land had to give has consent before the 
others could move towards securing the, he could arbitrarily 
destroy the valuable quality of the land.” 
What this suggests is that the Articles quoted above from the 1982 Form, 
despite the seemingly plain language modifying the co-tenancy 
relationship, may not, in fact, modify the relationship but only ensure that 
those who consent cannot be charged for any portion of the operation.71 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Article VI.B.2 of the operating agreement is related to the non-consent provisions 
pertinent to reworking a well not then producing in paying quantities. 
 70. 68 S.W.3d 147 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, pet. denied). 
 71. In the article “The AAPL Model Form Operating Agreement After Cone v. 
Fagadau—Where Are We Now?” in the July/August, 2003 edition of Landman, author and 
oil and gas lawyer Michel Curry suggested language expanding coverage of Article VII.D.3 
from just accounting purposes to also act as an absolute prohibition on such expenditures 
except in compliance with the express terms of Article VII.D.3. 
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C. AFEs and Modifications of JOA  
 Questions have arisen concerning whether or not AFEs can change the 
express terms of a JOA. 
Problem: An operator, Lee Oil, circulates a JOA to all working interest 
owners wherein the Contract Area was described to cover the proposed 
drilling of wells to a “depth of 2,000 feet or the Pratt formation, whichever 
is less” over a certain lateral extent. All parties receiving the JOA executed 
it. One well, Well 1, is drilled under the “Initial Well” provision and is a 
success. Lee Oil then circulated an AFE to cover costs to drill and complete 
a second well in the Contract Area of the JOA, Well 2. This AFE was not 
expressly consented to by any non-operator, however, several non-
operators contributed their proportionate share of the costs anyway. Two 
non-operators, Peart Petroleum and Lifeson Gas, did not consent to the 
AFE nor did they contribute their proportionate share of the costs of Well 
2. Lee Oil drilled Well 2 to a depth of 2,112 feet and brought in a producing 
well. With respect to Well 2, Lee Oil treated Peart and Lifeson as non-
consent working interest owners under the terms of the JOA.  
A dispute arose over whether or not the terms of the JOA applied, 
particularly the non-consent penalty. The operator argued that the AFE for 
Well 2 modified the express terms of the JOA to cover a well drilled to 
2,000 feet or more. The two non-operators argued that the AFE had not 
modified the JOA and that they were not subject to the non-consent penalty. 
Has the AFE modified the express terms of the JOA? 
In Hill v. Heritage Resources, Inc., as part of a large body of very 
contentious litigation covering several issues and parties, a Texas appellate 
court held that additional consideration was needed to modify the JOA, and 
further opined that “[t]he…J.O.A. was entered into by sixteen entities, 
besides Heritage.72 Accordingly, any modification of the contract would 
require the mutual assent of all the parties.” Additionally, the court found 
that “there is no evidence of a clear intent on behalf of the parties to modify 
the J.O.A. [and further that] formal modification of the…J.O.A. was never 
expressly addressed or requested.”73  
Simply stated, after execution of a JOA, the majority view is that an 
operator cannot unilaterally modify the JOA just through the circulation of 
an AFE. However, unless the terms of the AFE or the work done under the 
                                                                                                                 
 72. 964 S.W.2d 89, 112 – 115 (Tex. App.—El. Paso 1997, pet. denied). 
 73. Id.  
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AFE contradict or leave the domain covered by the JOA, once signed, the 
terms can be binding even if the costs rise above the estimate of the AFE.  
D. Cost Overruns 
Problem: Under the terms of a JOA, operator Young sent out an AFE 
and non-operators Scott and Johnson executed it. Drilling commences. 
During drilling, however, when the expenditure amount contained in the 
AFE was reached, Scott declared that it would pay no more of the costs of 
drilling even though the target depth had not yet been reached. Young and 
Johnson decided to continue drilling and continue operations until the 
target formation was reached and tested. Due to the test results and Scott’s 
absence, Young and Johnson agreed to terminate further development. Is 
Scott liable for its proportionate share of the continued drilling? 
In M & T, Inc. v. Fuel Resources Dev. Co.,74 the Federal District of 
Colorado explained that, “[i]n the oil and gas industry, it is understood and 
accepted that when one signs an AFE, he is committed to his proportionate 
share of the necessary costs in drilling to the objective specified in the AFE, 
unless the parties mutually agree to terminate drilling earlier or to attempt a 
completion at a shallower formation. The industry norms are consistent 
with the contracts and the parties’ course of dealing with each other [as to 
the well in question].”75 M & T, Inc. illustrates not only the use of the AFE 
but the problem of major cost overruns. One provision of the operating 
agreement (Article VII.D.3 of the three most recent versions of the Form 
JOA) imposes a maximum limit on reasonably estimated expenditures that 
the operator can incur on a new project without the consent of all non-
operators. This would be of no help to the non-operator in M & T, Inc., 
however, as the overruns in that case related entirely to the Initial Well, 
which had already been authorized in the form terms of the JOA. 
                                                                                                                 
 74. 518 F. Supp. 285, (D. Colo. 1981). 
 75. Id. at 289. But See Sonat Exploration Co. v. Mann, 785 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(applying Mississippi law) in which the 5th Circuit found that, despite defendants having 
signed an AFE, defendants were not bound to pay for their share of costs because defendants 
had not also signed the JOA. The 5th Circuit explained that “[Plaintiff] first argues that an 
AFE, standing alone, constitutes a binding promise to pay a stated share of drilling and 
completion costs. No supporting authority was furnished to the trial court and our attention 
has been invited to none. Our research discloses no authority for the proposition that an AFE 
is enforceable against one who has not signed an accompanying operating agreement. The 
case cited by appellant, M & T, Inc. involved an AFE issued pursuant to a valid operating 
agreement between the parties.” (Id. at 1234.)  
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In the above scenario, consider the outcome if the following clause had 
been introduced to the JOA: “Parties further agree that written approval 
shall be required for any expenditures that exceed the AFEs attached hereto 
by twenty-five percent (25.00%) or more.” This usually serves to remove 
doubt, as a Texas Court of Appeals held when ruling that such a written 
approval requirement applies to overall costs, stating, “the AFE referred to 
in the approval clause is the total AFE set out by the parties for the 
[prospect]”76 
Problem: Betts Petroleum, operator of the Wastin’ Time Field under a 
1956 Form, sent non-operator Allman Gas notice and an election ballot 
after drilling and completing a new well. Allman Gas elected to go non-
consent. Betts Petroleum then applied the 300% non-consent penalty to the 
share of the proceeds attributable to Allman Gas. Allman Gas sued, 
contesting application of the non-consent penalty, and arguing it did not get 
notice and a ballot prior to the drilling of the well as required by the JOA. 
The JOA, however, did not contain any limitation on when the operator 
could commence work on a project. Can the penalty be enforced?  
In Bonn Operating Co. v. Devon Energy Production Co.,77 the operator 
under a 1956 Form sent the non-operator notice after it had drilled and 
completed a new well. The JOA contained a subsequent operations clause 
providing that a party who desires to drill a well “may give the other party 
written notice of the proposed operation” and that the other JOA parties 
then have thirty days to respond. The non-consent penalty was 300%. 
The non-operator responded that it elected to go non-consent, and then 
objected when the operator charged the non-operator’s share of production 
with the non-consent penalty as well as its proportionate share of the total 
costs of the new well. In subsequent litigation the non-operator contended 
that the operator could not charge the non-consent penalty because the 
operator had failed to give notice prior to drilling the well, as it alleged was 
required by the JOA. 
 The court rejected this argument, pointing out that the JOA did not place 
any limitation on when the operator could commence work. Moreover, 
because the operator’s drilling and related operations were essentially 
completed before notice was sent to the non-operator, the non-operator had 
the highly unusual advantage of being able to determine all costs associated 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Pegasus Energy Group, Inc. v. Cheyenne Petroleum Co., 3 S.W.3d 112, 122 (Tex. 
App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied). 
 77. 613 F.3d 532 (5th Cir. 2010).  
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with drilling and any risk associated with the well before deciding whether 
to consent or not. 
E. Consent to Subsequent Operations  
 All Form JOAs contain terms that govern how wells will be drilled or 
operations conducted and completed after the Initial Well is complete.78 
Unlike the Initial Well, the drilling of which is a project usually described 
in some detail in the JOA itself and to which all parties to the JOA would 
presumably be interested in participating (or they would not have signed the 
JOA), these subsequent operations are less likely to be specifically and 
individually defined and are less likely to see 100% participation from the 
JOA signatories. Each of the Form JOAs therefore contains both protocols 
by which the signatories can propose subsequent wells and operations and 
also chose to participate in the wells and operations proposed by others.  
Problem: Davies Petroleum, as operator, and Knopfler Oil, as non-
operator, executed a 1977 Form covering the Lola lease. They agreed that 
the Initial Well would target the Iron Hand formation at a depth of 9000 
feet TD. After drilling to within 500 feet of the top of the Iron Hand 
formation, however, Davies Petroleum began to encounter difficulties and 
proposed, as it believed was required under Article VI.B of the JOA, a 
sidetrack operation to reach the Iron Hand formation from another 
direction. After receiving the sidetrack proposal, Knopfler Oil refused to 
pay for its share of the higher costs of the sidetrack operation. Davies 
Petroleum continued with the sidetrack operation. The operation was a 
failure and Knopfler Oil continued to refuse to pay any portion of the costs 
for the sidetrack operation. Davies Petroleum sued Knopfler Oil for its 
share of the sidetrack operation costs. Knopfler Oil claimed that the 
sidetrack operation was not part of the drilling of the Initial Well, but 
rather was a subsequent operation for which it had not consented. Will this 
argument succeed? 
One vector of invective has been disputes regarding whether and, if so, 
what activity conducted on the Initial Well after drilling is complete 
constitutes “subsequent operations.” In Holt Oil & Gas Corp. v. Harvey,79 
the Fifth Circuit considered whether a sidetrack operation conducted on an 
Initial Well was a subsequent operation under the terms of the 1977 Form. 
The facts of Holt, identical to the scenario above, and the terms of Article 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See § 12 of the 1956 Form and art. VI.B of the 1977, 1982, and 1989 forms.  
 79. 801 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1986). 
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VI.B of the 1977 Form, caused the court to admit that it was not clear if the 
sidetracking counted as part of drilling the Initial Well or if it was a 
“subsequent operation.” Specifically, the court noted that neither the 
definition of Initial Well nor the definition of subsequent operations made it 
clear into what category the sidetracking fell, nor could the court find any 
indication elsewhere in the JOA to definitively place the sidetrack into a 
particular category. Ultimately, the court concluded that the record 
indicated the existence of enough evidence for the trial jury to find that the 
sidetracking was part of the Initial Well. 
1. Proper Notice of Subsequent Operations 
 All the Form JOAs provide that the time interval that each party 
receives to make a decision on whether or not to participate in a proposed 
operation begins when that party receives written notice of the proposal. 
Because of the time limits placed upon the return of a participation ballot 
after it is received and the non-consent penalty in the Form JOAs, and 
because some JOAs provide that parties can even lose any future interest in 
operations in which they choose not to participate, disputes have erupted 
over what information must go into the election notice. 
Problem: Hynde Gas, as operator, and Chambers Oil, as non-operator, 
executed a 1977 Form covering the Loose Screw Prospect. After several 
wells were completed, Hynde Gas proposed a well to the Precious 
formation at a particular location. The notice contained a description of the 
well to be drilled, its location, proposed TD, and target formation. Is that 
enough information for Chambers Oil to make an informed decision 
whether or not to participate?  
In Acadienergy, Inc. v. McCord Exploration Co.,80 a Louisiana court 
examined what is necessary for proper notice for a proposed subsequent 
operation under the 1977 Form. Article VI.B.1 of the Form JOA 
specifically set forth the requirements in proposing subsequent operations 
to the Initial Well. After a examining the clause, the court parsed out five 
datum due the recipient to constitute proper notice: (1) a description of the 
well or project; (2) well or project location; (3) the depth of a proposed 
well; (4) the formation being targeted for completion or reworking; and (5) 
an estimate of the cost. The court found proper notice had not been given 
by the proposer—even though the non-responding notice recipient had 
indicated elsewhere it did not agree with the objective formation for 
                                                                                                                 
 80. 596 So.2d 1334 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1992). 
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completion—because a change had been made between the TD location on 
the notice and in subsequent actuality. In addition, the notice recipient had 
both expressed a desire to join in an operation at the eventual location and 
asked for more information concerning the initial proposal. Another case in 
Texas, after citing a notification clause in the JOA germane to that case that 
was similar to that found in Acadienergy, held that an AFE, if it comes 
freighted with the necessary information described above, was detailed 
enough to count as an adequate proposal for a subsequent operation.81  
2. Commencement of Operations  
The length of the election period given to the non-operator often depends 
on whether a rig is on site to conduct the operation or not. Some 
opportunities will not last until the end of the election period and the 
operator may want to immediately start drilling activities. However, 
determining exactly when an operator can begin work that requires consent 
elections by the other party is difficult using the Form JOAs. For example, 
Article VI.B of the 1977 Form does not make absolutely clear that the 
operator can commence work immediately instead of waiting until the end 
of the election period.  
Problem: Orr Operating, operator under a 1977 Form, sent out notices 
and a request for consent regarding a proposal to drill a well. The JOA 
required a thirty-day notice period for proposed subsequent operations 
under Article VI.B Two days after sending out the notices, Orr Operating 
started drilling. A non-operator, Ocasec Oil, challenged the drilling, 
arguing that the consent period, as defined in the JOA, had to run before 
operations for the proposed operation can begin. Is Ocasec Oil correct? 
In Valance Operating Company v. Elmagene W. Dorsett,82 Operator 
Valence gave non-operator Dorsett written notice of its intent to drill eight 
wells from 1996 to 2001. Dorsett received the notices but did not consent to 
the drilling of any of the wells and did not contribute to the drilling costs. In 
each case, Valence had begun site work—and in a couple of cases actual 
drilling operations—before thirty days had elapsed after Dorsett’s receipt of 
the consent notice. Valence imposed the non-consent penalty described in 
Article VI.B.2 and Dorsett sued. The Texas Supreme Court held that, since 
the relevant non-consent penalties were enforceable and nothing was 
                                                                                                                 
 81. French v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 439 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App—El 
Paso 1969, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 
 82. 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005). 
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expressed in the JOA to the contrary, the operator could immediately begin 
work on a proposed operation before expiration of the notice period.  
To avoid such litigious delay and cost, a custom clause may be 
considered deciding whether or not the operator has the latitude to 
commence operations immediately. If so, the non-consent penalties should 
be expressly enforceable notwithstanding the commencement of operations 
prior to the expiration of the election period.    
Questions also exist about how to order follow up operations once the 
initial target is reached. Parties to the JOA may have different priorities 
about the next step—whether to deepen or plugback, recomplete an existing 
payzone, or send out a lateral—and choosing one may foreclose the 
opportunity to do another. Parties may want to consider adding a custom 
provision that establishes a priority among various operations that might be 
proposed once the target formation or depth is achieved. 
Problem: Emmett Oil, as operator, executed a 1989 Form along with 
Moore Gas and Levine Production, both as non-operators, which included 
the following clause regarding subsequent operations in Article VI.B.1: 
Proposed Operations: If any party hereto should desire to drill 
any well on the Contract Area other than the Initial Well, or if 
any party should desire to Rework, Sidetrack, Deepen, 
Recomplete or Plug Back a dry hole or a well no longer capable 
of producing in paying quantities in which such party has not 
otherwise relinquished its interest in the proposed objective Zone 
under this agreement, the party desiring to drill, Rework, 
Sidetrack, Deepen, Recomplete or Plug Back such a well shall 
give written notice of the proposed operation to the parties who 
have not otherwise relinquished their interest in such objective 
Zone under this agreement and to all other parties in the case of a 
proposal for Sidetracking or Deepening, specifying the work to 
be performed, the location, proposed depth, objective Zone and 
the estimated cost of the operation. The parties to whom such a 
notice is delivered shall have thirty (30) days after receipt of the 
notice within which to notify the party proposing to do the work 
whether they elect to participate in the cost of the proposed 
operation. Failure of a party to whom such notice is delivered to 
reply within the period above fixed shall constitute an election 
by that party not to participate in the cost of the proposed 
operation.  
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The Initial Well was drilled and completed. Emmett Oil sent the non-
operators a certified letter proposing subsequent operations. Specifically, 
Emmett Oil proposed to drill and operate a second well. Moore Gas did not 
respond to this proposal within the thirty day window but did send Emmett 
Oil a proposal that Moore Gas would drill and operate the second well 
within the thirty day window. Emmett Oil filed an action requesting the 
court to declare it the operator of the proposed well. Who is the operator 
now? 
In Nearburg v. Yates Petroleum Corp.,83 Nearburg sent Yates a certified 
letter proposing to drill an additional well in accordance with the terms of 
Article VI.B in the 1977 Form to which they were both signatories. Yates 
received this letter on Dec. 1, 1994 but failed to respond within thirty days. 
Yates did, however, send Nearburg a letter dated Jan. 11, 1995, stating that 
Yates proposed to drill the same well. On Dec. 29, 1994, Yates had also 
obtained a permit to allow it, as operator, to drill the same well. Nearburg 
filed a complaint alleging that Yates’ actions violated Nearburg’s rights 
under the JOA and prevented Nearburg from obtaining a drilling permit for 
the subsequent well. Nearburg sought to be named operator of the 
subsequent well. In response, Yates asserted that an election not to 
participate (i.e. Yates non-response non-consent to Nearburg’s notice of 
Dec. 1, 1994) constituted an offer to relinquish the party’s interest in 
production from a proposed operation, and that this offer could be accepted 
by the proposing party (i.e. Nearburg) by “actually commencing work” 
within sixty days of the end of the election period, as described in Article 
VI.B.2. Therefore, until Nearburg, the proposing party, accepted 
performance by drilling, Yates had the right to change its election by 
withdrawing its offer, meaning it terminated its offer to relinquish its 
interest by its Jan. 11, 1995 letter communicating its intent to participate in 
the drilling of the subsequent well.84  
The Court of Appeals in New Mexico found this interpretation “strained” 
and held that the party that initially proposed a subsequent well under the 
terms of the JOA (i.e. Nearburg) became the operator of that well and that 
Yates’ election not to participate in drilling was not an “offer” that could be 
withdrawn before the proposing party signified its “acceptance” by 
commencing work on proposed operation. Practically speaking, this 
interpretation of the non-consent penalty provisions in the 1977 Form 
meant the non-consent provisions acted as a covenant (to pay the penalty) 
                                                                                                                 
 83. 943 P.2d 560 (N.M. App. 1997). 
 84. Whatever one thinks of this argument, it certainly is creative.  
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triggered by a condition precedent (either failing to elect to join—a default 
non-consent under most JOAs—or an actual election not to join) instead of 
a contract option. In deciding, the court reasoned, “The operating 
agreement provisions are clear. Failure to elect to participate within thirty 
days of receiving notice of a proposed operation constitutes an election not 
to participate. When this condition occurs, the non-consent penalty 
results.”85 
3. Changing a Consent or Non Consent 
If, after receiving notice of a proposal to drill a new well, a party makes 
an election, can it change its election if the change is made before the end 
of the period? 
Problem: Grohl Oil, a non-operator, consented to participate in drilling 
a well proposed by operator Novoselic Natural Gas. The 1982 Form under 
which the parties were operating provided that parties have thirty days to 
consent or not consent after receiving a proposal. Grohl Oil answered the 
proposal affirmatively ten days after being given notice by the operator. 
Ten days after that, when Grohl Oil received an AFE associated with the 
operation, Grohl Oil changed decision and rescinded the approval, instead 
going non-consent. Novoselic Natural Gas had already started the 
operations described in the consent notice and AFE and sues, claiming 
Grohl Oil could not change its election. Can Grohl Oil rescind its consent?  
A divided court ruled in XTO Energy, Inc. v. Smith Production, Inc.86 
that a party could not change its election despite the fact that the consent 
period had not yet run. Specifically, the plaintiff non-operator initially 
notified the operator of its decision to go non-consent as to the subsequent 
operations. All of the other non-operators elected to participate and advised 
the operator that they would carry the non-consenting party’s share of 
expenses. Before the notification period elapsed, the plaintiff non-operator 
notified the operator that it was revoking its prior non-consent and had 
elected to participate in the new wells. The operator responded that the 
plaintiff non-operator could not change its election and it would be deemed 
to have relinquished its interest in the new wells to the consenting parties, 
who would recover plaintiff’s share of expenses from its share of 
production in the new wells plus a 300% penalty, as provided for in the 
JOA. Plaintiff non-operator filed suit against the operator, arguing that it 
                                                                                                                 
 85. Id. at 571. 
 86. 282 S.W.3d 672 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. granted, cause 
dism’d). 
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had the right to change its decision within 30 days after receiving 
notification of the proposal for subsequent operations and that the operator 
and other parties were not entitled to withhold the non-consent penalty. 
  In ruling against the non-operator that attempted to rescind its non-
consent, the court relied on Article VI.B of the 1982 Form which provides 
that when the party proposing the new operations receives all notifications, 
the proposing party must “immediately … advise the Consenting Parties of 
the total interest of the parties approving” the proposal, and if it 
recommends that the proposal operations proceed, the Consenting Parties, 
as defined in the form, have 48 hours in which to notify the proposing party 
whether they wish to carry a proportionate part of the non-consenter’s 
share. The court reasoned that although the JOA does not deal expressly 
with changes of election within the notice period, a construction that 
precludes changes is more consistent with the “immediate” notification 
requirement. The court also believed such a construction also better 
accorded with the time-sensitive nature of the proposing party’s obligations 
so that it can make the necessary arrangements to begin drilling within the 
90 days specified under the parties’ JOA. 
4. No Written Consent Given 
Problem: Mercury Oil and Deacon Gas executed a JOA as operator and 
non-operator, respectively. Deacon Gas consented on the telephone to the 
drilling of two (2) wells in the Moose Pasture Project with costs to be borne 
equally, but no AFEs were ever circulated for the wells. Mercury Oil drills 
both wells as operator. One well results in a very marginal well, and the 
other is completely dry. Deacon Gas refused to pay for its half of the 
project. Mercury Oil sues to recover Deacon Gas’ portion of the costs. In 
response, Deacon Gas argued that because no AFEs were sent, it did not 
consent to the operations. Is Deacon Gas correct?  
The other side of proper notice is proper election. In C & C Partners v. 
Sun Exploration & Production Co.,87 the Texas Court of Appeals in Dallas 
considered a dispute between an operator and non-operator under the terms 
of a JOA of unknown vintage. C & C Partners and Sun agreed to jointly 
participate in oil and gas operations on several drilling prospects. Sun 
eventually sued C & C to recover C & C’s unpaid share of the drilling and 
plugging costs for one well, the completion costs for two other wells, and 
the drilling and completion costs for three additional wells.  
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C & C argued on appeal it did not consent to the operations for which 
Sun sought recovery of costs, claiming the consent requirements of the JOA 
had to be evidenced in writing by means of AFEs. And since, according to 
C & C, no AFEs evidencing consent were introduced into evidence, C & C 
was not liable because of the failure of a condition precedent. 
The court held that the contract did not require any specific form of 
consent. After concluding that the contract provisions regarding consent 
were unambiguous and that the contracts clearly required consent, the court 
also noted the JOA did not specify that any particular form of consent was 
required and therefore consent given over the telephone would be permitted 
in many circumstances. However, the court also noted that a telephoned 
notice or response, whether to give consent or not, was required to be 
followed up by confirmation in writing, opining further that the only 
requirement of a writing would be in the case of confirmation of consent or 
non-consent or confirmation of notice of a proposed operation. Therefore, it 
was held confirmation of consent was obviously distinct and separate from 
consent itself, that the contract did not state that consent was invalid or 
ineffective if it was not confirmed in writing, and that the provisions on 
consent mentioned nothing about the exclusive need for executed AFEs to 
show consent or not.88 
The aforementioned Hill v. Heritage Resources, Inc., however, touched 
upon the issue of lack of proper consent, and went the other way when 
considering a 1982 Form. In that case, one party asserted—citing C & C 
Partners—that oral consent to an operation sufficed. The court of appeals 
in El Paso disagreed, however, finding that Article XII of the 1982 Form 
expressly required a written format for all notices and that telephonic 
consent only sufficed for proposals to “rework, plug back or drill deeper.” 
Given the proliferation of types of communications in recent years—email, 
text messages, even “tweeting”—such disputes will likely continue.  
F. “In or Out” Clause and Changes in Ownership Percentages 
The effect non-consenting parties can have on the percentage interests of 
the consenting parties if the proposed operation is thereafter initiated—
particularly to the proposer of the operation—is important. The 1989 Form 
has four options for parties considering whether or not to participate in 
subsequent operations. They can (i) not participate—go “non-consent” (ii) 
limit their participation to their original fractional interest, (iii) pay a share 
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proportionate to their interest relative to the interests of all consenting 
parties, or (iv) pay as in (iii) plus take on any whole or portion of the 
expense of non-consenting parties share that the other consenting parties 
elected not to take.89 Some JOAs may also contain an ‘In or Out’ clause 
providing that upon commencement of an operation, parties that choose not 
to participate forfeit their interest in the well. Any interest of a non-
consenting party that is not picked up by a consenting party will be deemed 
carried by the proposer—provided the proposer does not withdraw the 
proposal. Depending on the language of the JOA at issue, such interest 
assignments can have ramifications on the operatorship due to possible 
changes in who owns the majority interest. 
Problem: Heath Oil, acting as a contract operator (i.e. without a 
working interest in the Contract Area of the relevant JOA) circulated an 
AFE proposing to ‘clean the wellbore’ of the Pink Slip No. 1 well, 
operations upon which were governed by a 1977 Form. Wallace Gas, a 
minority 33% interest owner, was the only one of several non-operators 
that agreed to participate in the project. Wallace Gas paid for its own 
interest’s participation. Wallace Gas likewise sought to assume the working 
interest of the non-consent owners through activation of an “in and out” 
clause that provided for relinquishment of the non-consented working 
interests upon commencement of the proposed operation. To that end, 
Wallace Gas sent Heath Oil a second check with the written condition that 
the check only be applied to Wallace Oil's “purchase of its portion of 
the…non-consent interests.” Together with the working interest it already 
owned, this additional working interest would have made Wallace Gas the 
majority working interest owner in the Contract Area.  
Heath Oil, however, knowing that Wallace Gas was past due on its 
billing payments, informed Wallace Gas that it was not sure how it was 
supposed to apply the money and placed the second tranche of money in an 
escrow account. Heath Oil then proposed conducting an ‘acid workover’ 
process to access new reserves. This operation was delayed for lack of acid 
but Heath Oil secured an extension on the lease. Meanwhile, Wallace Gas 
first informed Heath Oil that it did not agree with the proposed operation 
and, because the acid workover was not completed, further claimed that it 
should be the operator. Second, Wallace Gas subsequently cut the locks on 
the fence surrounding the Pink Slip No. 1 and commenced the operations. 
Heath Oil withdrew its AFE proposal. In the ensuing litigation, the court 
must figure out who the operator is and who is owed money.  
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In Stable Energy, L.P. v. Kachina Oil & Gas, Inc.,90 when considering a 
similar quandary, the Texas Court of Appeals in Austin held that because a 
certain project proposed by the operator Kachina was never started, 
ownership of the interests of parties who did not agree to participate never 
transferred to the parties seeking to become the majority-owning operator.  
First considering Article V.B.1 of the JOA—“If Operator…no longer 
owns an interest in the Contract Area…it shall cease to be Operator without 
any action by Non Operator, except the selection of a successor.”91—the 
court noted that contract operator Kachina was indeed vulnerable to 
replacement. Noting also the passage in Article VI.B.2.—“the successor 
Operator shall be selected by the affirmative vote of two (2) or more parties 
owning a majority interest based on ownership.”92—the court noted that the 
would-be successor operator could have been deemed the operator if it 
owned a majority interest when it so claimed—before taking over physical 
operations.  
Ultimately, however, the court also noted language in Article VI.B.2 of 
the JOA: “Upon commencement of operations for the . . . reworking . . . of 
any such well by Consenting Parties . . . each Non-Consenting Party shall 
be deemed to have relinquished to Consenting Parties . . . all of such Non-
Consenting Party’s interest in the well and share of production 
therefrom.”93 The court rejected the arguments that the ownership interest 
transferred because the work originally proposed by the contract operator 
was commenced after the party seeking to replace the operator seized 
control of the well.94 The would-be operator declared that it was elected as 
operator prior to seizing the well and commencing operations, but it could 
not have acquired the additional interests necessary to be a majority 
working interest owner until after it entered and commenced operations, as 
required by the JOA “in or out” clause.  For that reason, the election of the 
new operator was held ineffective. Operator removal will be considered in 
more in the second article in this series.  
G. “Other Operations” Clauses, AFEs, and JIBs 
After the AFEs circulate, the newer JOA Forms provide a mechanism by 
which each participating working interest owner receives ‘joint interest 
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 91. Id. at 332. (The opinion states the JOA was executed in 1980 but does not make 
clear what JOA form, if any, it was. The author believes it to be a 1977 Form.) 
 92. Id.  
 93. Id. (emphasis added)  
 94. Id., at 332-333. 
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billings’ (“JIBs”) for its proportionate share of operating expenses.95 Newer 
JOAs provide significant leverage to the project operator, as the operator is 
allowed to put a lien on any party in default on its joint interest billings. On 
the other hand, one way Form JOAs rein in expensive and potentially 
unwanted activities by the operator is the “other operations” clause. When 
the high costs usually associated with oil and gas operations meet the 
necessity for the operator to employ a quick response to an unexpected 
occurrence or to just react to changing circumstances, the “other 
operations” clause is often the source of disputes.96 For example, Article 
VI.D. of the 1989 Form provides: 
Operator shall not undertake any single project reasonably 
estimated to require an expenditure in excess of ______ Dollars 
($______) except in connection with drilling, sidetracking, 
reworking, deepening, completing, recompleting, or plugging 
back of a well that has been previously authorized by or pursuant 
to this agreement, provided however, that in case of explosion, 
flood or other sudden emergency, whether of the same or 
different nature, Operator may take such steps and incur such 
expenses as in its opinion are required to deal with the 
emergency to safeguard life and property but Operator, as 
promptly as possible, shall report the emergency to the other 
parties. If Operator prepares an AFE for its own use, Operator 
shall furnish any Non-Operator so requesting an information 
copy thereof for any single project costing in excess of _____ 
Dollars ($____). 
Any operator concerned about invoking the “other operations” clause in a 
Form JOA should seek non-operator approval before attempting any 
activity that could be construed as an “other operation.” Some cases have 
defined the “other operations” clause quite broadly to include any 
operations that cost more than the dollar limit provided for in the JOA and 
that have either not been specifically authorized by the parties or that are 
necessary to correct a “sudden emergency.”97 Such broad interpretation of 
the “other operations” clause as provided for in the 1977, 1982, and 1989 
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forms could possibly require an AFE for operations that are considered 
either routine maintenance or that are recommended by trade associations 
such as the American Petroleum Institute or the International Association of 
Drilling Contractors, unless those operations were specifically addressed in 
a prior AFE or JOA custom provision and approved by the non-operator(s). 
Heightened regulatory oversight of oil and gas operations related to 
threatened spills and other environmental problems raises concerns about 
an operator’s ability to promptly react to potential environmental hazards or 
to conduct other operations necessary stave off a problem that, in the future, 
may cost more to fix when it rises to “emergency” levels. For example, the 
operator may encounter a condition has not yet led to a full-blown 
“emergency” but that nevertheless may need to be handled promptly to 
avoid potential liability under a state groundwater contamination regulation. 
In such a situation, there may not be enough time to formally issue an AFE 
and await responses. 
Problem: Nugent Oil, operator, and Bon Jovi Gas, non-operator, 
executed a 1977 Form over the Runaway Prospect in the state of Shock. 
While recompleting a well—an operation for which Bon Jovi Gas had 
received an AFE it subsequently approved—Nugent Oil noticed that a large 
fracwater disposal pit dug for the recompletion operation and other 
contemplated production activities is not lined with clay. The state oil and 
gas commission for Shock had been considering for a number of years a 
regulation that would require clay liners for fracwater pits. Other options 
have been considered also, however, such as requiring metal tanks or 
simply having no requirements. Knowing that lining the pit with clay will be 
a lot more expensive after the pond is in use, Nugent Oil paid $25,000 to 
make the change but did not send Bon Jovi Gas an AFE for the project, 
thinking it was covered both under the prior AFE and that the project was 
an “emergency operation” as described by the JOA. Later, Bon Jovi Gas 
received a JIB for the work and balked at paying, claiming it had not 
approved the operation, that it was not specifically related to the 
recompletion project, and that the state had not settled on any fracwater pit 
liner requirements. Nugent Oil sued to recover the portion of the lining 
operation it says it was owed by Bon Jovi Gas. Can it recover?   
In Paint Rock Operating, LLC v. Chisholm Exploration, Inc.,98 Justice 
Rick Strange issued the opinion of the Eastland Court of Appeals in Texas 
that considered a situation wherein an operator had presented a non-
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operator a JIB with unapproved charges—costs never previously described 
in an approved AFE—that were included in a longer list of charges that the 
non-operator had expressly approved in prior AFEs. Both the AFE and 
subsequent JIBs were promulgated under the terms of a 1977 JOA.99 The 
non-operator returned the JIBs with the contested charges redacted and a 
check for the uncontested charges. The non-operator refused to pay because 
it had received no AFE for the contested charges. The operator sued to 
recover the disputed charges, alleging that charges were for necessary 
repairs and that the non-operator had not timely challenged the charges in 
the JIBs. The contested charges were in excess of the $10,000 limit in the 
“other operations” clause in the JOA.   
The court held that the operator breached the terms of the JOA if it only 
sends a JIB to a non-operator that includes expenses in excess of the 
previously settled “other operations” amount without first providing an 
AFE describing same. In addition, the operator could be liable for 
attorneys’ fees or other damages for performing “other operations” without 
first issuing an AFE. Therefore, an operator should always ensure AFEs are 
sent when repair or other surprise costs manifest themselves, and keep the 
“other operations” amount limit in mind when incurring emergency costs—
particularly with the 1989 Form. 
 
(to be continued in Vol. 1, No. 2) 
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